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A commentary on
Toward an integrative account of social
cognition: marrying theory of mind and
interactionism to study the interplay of
Type 1 and Type 2 processes
by Bohl, V., and van den Bos, W.
(2012). Front. Hum. Neurosci. 6:274. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2012.00274
Bohl and van den Bos (2012) sketch an
approach to the study of social cogni-
tion aimed at integrating mindreading
and alternatives based on social inter-
action. Inspired by dual-process models,
they draw an analogy between, on the one
hand, Type 1 processes (fast, automatic,
and situated) and processes involved in
supporting interaction and, on the other,
Type 2 processes (slow, volitional, and
domain-general) and mindreading. The
proposal has empirical potential, as inter-
active factors begin to be more systemati-
cally investigated in neuroscience.
Here, we clarify that what the
authors describe as “interactionism”—and
attribute in its radical form to us—is, in
important ways, different from the enac-
tive approach we defend. We argue for the
necessity of including interactive factors
in at least some forms of social under-
standing, and, as a consequence, for the
insufficiency of mindreading to account
for all of social cognition. But the authors
misinterpret our position. They suggest
that it implies the sufficiency of interactive
factors for explaining all of social under-
standing and, therefore, the non-necessity
of mindreading in any particular case of
social cognition. Overlooking the caveat
“in some cases” in this quote “[. . .] we
can conceive of interaction dynamics as,
in some cases, delivering the necessary
cognitive performance” (De Jaegher et al.,
2010), they interpret that “individual
explanations become superfluous once
the interaction process is explained on
the supra-individual level” without the
caveat (p. 4). In effect, they make uni-
versal a claim about particulars. In our
view, they suggest, everything reduces
to a monopolizing strategy (understand-
ing interactions) and individual factors,
including reasoning about others, are only
secondary.
This misperception may result from a
“contrast effect” whereby after staring into
the dark for too long new shades of gray
are initially seen as blinding white.
In dynamical systems terms, the cou-
pling between two systems is constrained
by internal processes in each of them.
Social interaction is a coupling between
two or more autonomous agents that is
co-regulated by the interactors (they mod-
ify their coupling to satisfy some condi-
tion; e.g., approaching a speaker in the
presence of loud ambient noise so as to
hear them better) and the resulting rela-
tional dynamics acquires a form of auton-
omy (De Jaegher et al., 2010, p. 493).
Interactions depend on individual contri-
butions, but are not fully determined by
them. They depend also on the relational
dynamics between subjects, and other fac-
tors. According to our definition, studying
interaction requires an understanding of
the relation between the individual and
collective levels. This is why we criticize
sociological analyses of interaction for not
paying enough attention to individual cog-
nition (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007,
p. 492).
The enactive approach makes two main
moves; first, it posits systemic concepts for
understanding social interactions. Second,
it examines how interaction affects sense-
making, i.e., how intentional phenomena
aremodulated by patterns of coordination,
breakdowns, and recoveries between inter-
actors. This is participatory sense-making.
Does this mean that individual sense-
making, including abilities that could be
described as mindreading, cannot occur?
No. We never suggested that individual
cognitive performances are not relevant to
some forms of social cognition. In fact,
we explicitly call for a reconsideration of
individual mechanisms (De Jaegher et al.,
2010, p. 445). In our example of interac-
tion over a delayed communication line
misunderstanding arises from a combina-
tion of interactive and interpretive factors
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007, p. 498).
To be sure, we analyze in detail situa-
tions where interactions are central and
abstract reasoning less so (Murray and
Trevarthen, 1985; Auvray et al., 2009).
Our argument would be weak if we
couldn’t show empirical instantiations of
our claim.
Only in a recent paper do we move
into more radical terrain (Di Paolo and
De Jaegher, 2012). The Interactive Brain
Hypothesis states that the brain processes
at play during social cognition are func-
tionally shaped by interactions (among
other things!) or that their functionality
co-opts that of individual processes at play
during interactions. This is indeed more
radical, but it is a hypothesis open to
empirical refutation. And even this is still
not the same as saying that only interac-
tion matters.
Bohl and van den Bos state that enac-
tivism focuses on cooperative, smooth
interactions. But our claims do not depend
on this. In fact, participatory sense-
making relies crucially on coordination
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org January 2013 | Volume 6 | Article 345 | 1
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
De Jaegher and Di Paolo Enactivism is not interactionism
breakdowns. Breakdowns and recoveries
are basic to the generation of novel social
meaning. Without at least a minimal ele-
ment of conflict there would not be social
understanding. We discuss antagonistic
interactions involving misunderstandings
(e.g., De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007, p.
498) and consider conflict and interactive
escalation (Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2012,
p. 7, 10).
The authors complain that the enac-
tive perspective underplays subpersonal
processes. However, we use dynamical
models to explain experimental results
(e.g., Di Paolo et al., 2008; Froese and
Di Paolo, 2010). Like the explanation we
propose for perceptual crossing or the
double TV-monitor experiments, these are
strictly subpersonal and span individual
and transindividual factors. Phenomena
at this level of analysis (fields, attractors,
transients, etc.) do not involve intentional-
level terminology, unlike so-called
“subpersonal” processes proposed in min-
dreading explanations (“simulations” and
“inferences”). In contrast to functional-
ism, enaction takes the subpersonal level
very seriously and avoids mereological fal-
lacies and homuncular explanations that
nullify the very idea of a subpersonal level.
With these clarifications, we see Bohl
and van den Bos’s proposal as a research
heuristic that can surely enrich empirical
data. However, we worry about whether
this is a long-term integrative approach.
There are two ways of understanding
the proposal:
1. Individual sense-making is largely sup-
ported by Type 2 processes and interac-
tion by Type 1 processes.
2. The relation between individual sense-
making and interactive performances is
analogous to the relation between Type
2 and Type 1 processes.
The first reading is problematic for those
who claim that implicit mindreading is
supported by automatic processes that do
not involve volitional control (Type 1), as
noted by the authors (p. 8). And delibera-
tive Type 2 processes that are not involved
in the performance of mindreading can
still occur in interactions: for instance,
when two people try to solve a maths
problem together. Such processes can
constrain the interaction dynamics and
influence how interaction affects mutual
understanding.
We therefore understand the proposal
as an analogy (case 2) that calls for similar
methodologies as those used in research-
ing Type1/Type2 processes.
However, the proposal must not
amount to an uncritical combination of
two approaches. A theory of intersubjec-
tivity should address issues like: what are
the underlying principles that relate skilful
interaction and individual sense-making
of others? What neural/bodily mecha-
nisms are involved in each or indeed
shared? Is there a developmental “flow”
between skilful interactive and individual
sense-making capabilities? Is it a two-way
flow? How much do the two “types” inter-
penetrate, not just developmentally but in
the enaction of social understanding? Can
they always (ever?) be described as distinct
in principled ways?
Like other hybrid approaches in
cognitive science and biology (gene-
environment, nature-nurture, symbolic-
connectionist, etc.), the proposal must
avoid certain pitfalls. One is the risk of
reifying the descriptive elements (Types
1 and 2). Another is to take the distinc-
tion between them as clear-cut, foregoing
considerations of how they interpene-
trate. A hybrid approach can also lead to
explanations based on “contributions” (“a
performance is 80% interactive and 20%
mindreading”). This strategy is weak in
the long term. And in general, there is a
risk of adding epi-cycles when arguably
what the field needs is a Copernican
shift.
We applaud the authors for recog-
nizing interaction as important. But we
don’t think dichotomous frameworks
can achieve long-term theoretical integra-
tion. Hence our clarifications: enactivists
already do not think that all that matters
happens only in interaction. We criticize
methodological individualism but do not
thereby hold true its exact opposite (the
irrelevance of individual cognition). The
enactive stance attempts to supersede such
a dichotomy. In that sense, the motiva-
tions of the authors are aligned with those
of enactivism.
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